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WASHINGTON WATER RIGHTS -A SKETCH
ARVAL A. MORRIS*
The federal government acquired title to the land which is now the
State of Washington by treaty with England in 1846.1 This land was
subject to Congress' power of rule making, and, precluded only by
rights that had accrued prior to acquisition by the United States,'
Congress could dispose of it as public domain." Congress' power over
lands not appropriated within the state's boundaries continues today
as all rights thereto were expressly disclaimed by the people of the
state upon entry into the Union.'
The general water policy applicable to unappropriated land within
Washington Territory was that of prior appropriation and was an-
nounced by the Congress at an early date.6 Congressional enactments
were passed in order to conform policy to the then existing practice of
appropriation of water to a beneficial use and to encourage settlement
of new areas.7 The Desert Land Act8 of 1877 effected a severance of
all unappropriated non-navigable water from the public domain and
made these waters publici juris.9 In addition, the states, including those
forthcoming from the territories, were given plenary control over the
severed water and were allowed to determine for themselves to what
extent the rule of appropriation or the common-law rules of riparian
rights should apply to acquisition of water rights by private persons."
The effect of the federal legislation then did not bind the states to any
one water policy, but instead adopted the law of each state as the
federal law to be applied within the state's boundaries."
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
"Treaty With Great Britain in regard to limits westward of the Rocky Mountains,
June 15, 1846, 9 STAT. 869 (effective August 5, 1846). See Lownsdale v. Parrish, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 290 (1859) for earlier development.
2 U.S. CoixsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; See U.S. v. Fitzgerald, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 407
(1841).8 See Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839) ; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S.
517 (1877) ; See 1 KiNqNEY, aIm;GATION AND WATER RiGHTS §§ 402, 404, 405 (2nd ed.
1912).
4 See note 2 supra; also Howell v. Johnson, 89 Fed. 556 (C.C. D.Mont. 1898).
5 WVASH. CONsT. art XXVI, § 2.
a 14 STAT. 253 (1866) 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1952); 16 STAT. 218 (1870), 30 U.S.C.§ 52 (1952); 19 STAT. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1952); See California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1934).
7 11 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 805 (2nd ed. 1912).8 19 STAT. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1952).
0 California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
(1934).
aOId. at 164.
21 Ibid; U.S. v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist. 124 F. Supp. 818 (W. D. Wash. 1954).
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In 1897 the State of Washington, in Benton v. Johncox,' approved
Lux v. Haggin"3 thereby adopting what has come to be known as the
"California Doctrine"' 4 which recognizes one's ability, under certain
circumstances, to acquire water rights in the first instance either
through ownership of riparian land or through following state appropri-
ation procedures, or both. 5
RinARIAN RIGHTS
The general principle of Washington riparian water rights is that
every owner of land through which a natural stream of water flows or
abuts has a reasonable usufruct in that stream as it passes along, and
has an equal reasonable right with other riparian owners above and
below him, to the natural flow and produce of the water in its accus-
tomed channel free from unreasonable detention or substantial diminu-
tion in quantity or quality. No riparian owner may make any use of
the water unreasonably prejudicial to other riparian owners, unless he
has acquired a right to do so by license, grant or prescriptionY The
doctrine of riparian rights to the use of water is a rule of property law
in this state,' and should private rights in public riparian lands be
initiated by patenting these lands prior to appropriation of water from
them, the rights of the riparian owners are to be determined by rules
of the common-law and not by the rules of appropriation." Riparian
water rights are an adjunct of the land and are inseparably annexed to
the soil that abuts on a natural water course."
12 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495, 39 L.R.A. 107 (1897).
'13 69 Cal. 325, 4 Pac. 919, 10 Pac. 674 (1884).
1.4 Some of the other states following the doctrine are: Kansas, Montana, North
Dakota and South Dakota. Partially following it are: Nebraska, Oregon and Texas.
For further discussion see I WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES Ch. 5, 6,
7 (3rd. ed. 1911).
15 For a more complete discussion see Horowitz, Riparian And Appropriation Rights
To The Use of Water in; Washington, 7 WASH. L. REv. 197 (1932) ; BAILEY, WASH-
INGToN WATER RIGHTS (1923); BELCHER, WATERS AND WATER COURSES IN THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON (1946).
1 Riparian water rights attach to lands abutting on a lake (littoral rights) as well
as to those lands abutting on a stream. Riparian rights do not attach to school lands
until they pass into private ownership (the same rule is applied to Indian lands).
Hough v. Taylor, 110 Wash. 361, 188 Pac. 458 (1920) ; In re Doan Creek, 125 Wash.
14, 215 Pac. 343 (1923) ; See In re Crab Creek And Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac.
37 (1925) for a discussion of Colburn v. Winchell, 97 Wash. 27, 165 Pac. 1078 (1917)
and In re Doan Creek, supra., also note Ex rel Olding v. Stamply, 69 Wash. 368, 125
Pac. 148 (1912) indicating that water courses found on school lands are subject to
appropriation.
'7Nesalhous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1032 (1907).
18 Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913). Riparian rights date from the
first steps necessarily taken in order to secure a patent from the government. See also
In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).
19 Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147, 26 L.R.A. 425
(1894); Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash. 653, 104 Pac. 141 (1909). This includes an
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A natural water course is one which has a regular channel with a bed
and well defined banks and through which a current of water usually
flows." The flow need not be continuous, and at times, the channel may
be dry, but there must be an overall substantial existence.21 A natural
water course retains its identity even though it discharges into a swamp
or swag, provided however, that during a large portion of each year cur-
rents flow throughout the course of the swamp or swag and are confined
to regular well defined channels. 2 The fact that a stream channel
having bed, banks and current has been artificially deepened for drain-
age purposes, and is sometimes dry, does not deprive it of the character
of a water course. 3 A creek that rises and sinks along its course as the
soil changes from bed rock to porous, and carries water its entire length
only during the spring, is a natural water course.24 But, where water
flows only in the late winter or early spring when the ground is frozen
and snow is melting, there can be no water course having bed, banks
and current because the water is surface drainage occasioned by an
unusual freshet. 5 Surface water may form a natural water course at a
point where a reasonably well defined channel is formed having bed,
banks or sides and current, although the stream may be very small and
the water may not flow continuously. Should springs form the foun-
tainhead of a living water course, they become part and parcel of the
stream.27 The prerequisite element of a water course is that of current
owner whose boundaries extend over the bank and into the stream. State ex rel Davis
v. Superior Court, 84 Wash. 252, 146 Pac. 609 (1915). See Hirt v. Entus, 37 Wn2d
418, 224 P.2d 520 (1950) for the effect of accretion, reliction and avulsion on stream
boundaries.
20 Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889) ; Hastie v. Jenkins, 53 Wash.
21, 101 Pac. 495 (1909); 2 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 459 (1904);
but note Miller v. Eastern Lumber Co., 84 Wash. 31, 146 Pac. 171 (1915) wherein the
court relaxes the requirement of well defined banks.
"I Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889) ; Tierney v. Yaldma County,
136 Wash. 481, 239 Pac. 248 (1925); Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wn.2d 1, 94 P.2d 749(1939).22 Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147, 26 L.R.A. 425
(1894); Hastie v. Jenkins, 53 Wash. 21, 101 Pac. 495 (1909) ; Alexander v. Muenscher,
7 WVn.2d 557, 110 P2d 625 (1941). Ordinarily a swamp or swale is not a water course.
See Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash. 653, 104 Pac. 141 (1909) ; I KINNEY, IRRIGATION &
WATER RIGHTS § 316 (2nd ed. 1912).
2- Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147, 26 L.R.A. 425
(1894); Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wn.2d 1, 94 P.2d 749 (1939). If certain circumstances
should be present, a ditch might be held to constitute a "natural" water course. See
DeRuwe v. Morrison, 28 Wn.2d 797, 184 P2d 273 (1947) ; Miller v. Eastern Lumber
Co., 84 Wash. 31, 146 Pac. 171 (1915). But cf. Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276,
108 Pac. 608, (1910).
24 In re Johnson Creek, 159 Wash. 629, 294 Pac. 566 (1930).
25 Thorpe v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 488, 139 Pac. 221 (1914). But note Oregon-Wash-
ington Nay. Co. v. Royer, 255 Fed. 881 (9th Cir. 1919).
"6Alexander v. Muenscher, 7 Wn.2d 557, 110 P.2d 625 (1941); GoULD, WATERS
§ 263 (3rd ed. 1900).
27 In re Abtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926).
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or flow, 8 but the question of whether or not certain waters constitute a
water course is one of fact and properly for the jury to determine.""
Riparian rights do not exist in navigable water courses,"° although they
do exist in those non-navigable,"' because the state is the owner of the
bed and banks2 and the riparian proprietor owns none of the soil
under or abutting on the navigable watercourse.13
Riparian rights in non-navigable streams are neither easements nor
appurtenances to the land, but are inseparably attached to the soil and
pass by a grant of the land, unless specifically reserved." If a riparian
owner should assert a claim of right to water allegedly gained by fol-
lowing appropriation procedures, he does not waive his riparian rights
nor is his claim antagonistic to them. 5 The situs of riparian rights has
been confined within the points where the land abuts upon the stream
and a lower riparian was not allowed, by virtue -of his riparian rights,
to divert waters from a point on the stream above his uppermost tan-
gential point." The riparian proprietor does have an interest in parts
of the stream above and below him and may enjoin lesser uses of the
water that do him substantial injury." However, an upper riparian
owner cannot compel a lower water user to maintain either drainage
ditches or dams even though their discontinuance should do him
28DeRuwe v. Morrison, 28 Wn.2d 797, 184 P2d 273 (1947).20Tierney v. Yakima County, 136 Wash. 481, 239 Pac. 248 (1925). Rights to under-
ground flow will be protected in the same manner as those upon the surface, provided
the flow is within a true underground water course, and the presumption, once a
subterranean water course is shown to exist, is that it possesses a fixed and definite
course and channel varying only with the erosion which the water produces. Evans v.
City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935).
so Ex tel Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945
(1912) ; see also Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
i Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 39 Pac. 485, 39 L.R.A. 107 (1897). If the
stream be navigable then the high water mark delimits its boundary, and if non-nav-
igable, the thread of the stream. Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 Pac. 1062
(1922). See also Hirt v. Entus, 37 Wn2d 418, 224 P2d 620 (1950).
32WAsHi. CONST. art. XVII § 1. Title to non-navigable stream beds passes to the
patentee as an incident of the patent. See Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac.
239 (1909) ; also non-navigable lakes, see In re Clinton Water District, 36 Wn.2d 284,
218 P.2d 309 (1950).
83 They do attach to non-navigable water courses whose sources are navigable lakes.
New Whatcom v. Fair Hoven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735, 54 L.R.A. 190
(1901).
34 Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 39 Pac. 485 (1897).35 Nesalhous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1032 (1907). But neither does he
have a right to appropriate superior to others. Ex tel Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v.
Superior Court, 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945 (1912).
Be See Miller v. Baker, 68 Wash. 19, 122 Pac. 604 (1912).
87Kalama Light & Power Co. v. Kalama Driving Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pac. 469,
22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 641 (1908); also see Longmire v. Yakima Highlands Co., 95 Wash.
302, 163 Pac. 782 (1923) ; It; re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931).
He has the right to recurrent natural overflow from a stream. Still v. Palouse Irr. &
Power Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911).
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injury." If a segment of a tract of riparian land be severed in a way
so the severed segment becomes non-riparian, it loses forever its
riparian character, and a subsequent connection of the two tracts will
not restore riparian qualities to the severed segment."' No Washington
case has been found wherein it has been held that land, in order to be
riparian, must be within the watershed of the stream as is the Califor-
nia rule."0
From early times this state has adhered to a reasonable use theory
of riparian rights"' rather than a strict natural flow theory.42 The use
of water by riparian proprietors must be reasonable, and waters of non-
navigable streams" or lakes"4 in excess of the amount that can be used
beneficially within a reasonable time (directly or prospectively) on
riparian lands are subject to appropriation for use on non-riparian
lands." In other words, before he has any right of protest the riparian
owner must, with reasonable certainty, show that either at present or
within the near future, he will make use of the water for a beneficial
purpose; otherwise, it is subject to appropriation. 6 The rights of
riparian owners of the same use are coequal notwithstanding one
riparian owner's right attaching prior to that of another."7 No riparian
owner has the exclusive right to use "all of the waters of a stream to
the exclusion of other riparian owners, merely from the fact of his
riparian ownership.", 8 Water, when taken and used through an exer-
cise of the riparian right, must be utilized on riparian land and is
prohibited from use on non-riparian lands even though the non-riparian
38 Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Everett, 171 Wash. 471, 18 P.2d 53, 88 A.L.R. 123 (1933);
DeRuwe v. Morrison, 28 Wn.2d 797, 184 P.2d 273 (1947).39 Ex rcl Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
40 Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.)
1062 (1906); Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
See Yearsley v. Cater, note 39, supra at 289, where the court remarks: "This court
in the case of Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41, seems to
indicate an intention to follow the California rule in determining what constitutes
riparian lands." Cf. Weidensteiner v. Engdahl, 125 Wash. 106, 215 Pac. 378 (1923).
41 Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1890).
42 See In re Clinton Water District, 36 Wn2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950) (dissenting
opinion); Still v. Palouse Irr. & Power Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911);
Proctor v. Sine, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
-3 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
44 Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
45 Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926).
46 State v. American Fruit Growers, 135 Wash. 156, 237 Pac. 498 (1925) ; over-
ruled on other grounds in It re Yand's Estate, 23 Wn.2d 831, 162 P2d 434 (1945).
4 7 Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926) ; McEvoy v.
Taylor, 56 Wash. 357, 105 Pac. 851 (1909) ; Malley v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398,
153 Pac. 342 (1915) ; DeRuwe v. Morrison, 28 Wn2d 797, 184 P.2d 273 (1947); But
cf. Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash. 653, 104 Pac. 141 (1909).
4S Smith v. Nechanicky, 123 Wash. 8, 211 Pac. 880 (1923).
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user may possess a grant or license from the riparian owner.4" Rights
of riparian owners to reasonable beneficial use of waters exist mutu-
ally,"0 and the courts have jurisdiction to apportion waters among them
in order to secure to all riparian owners the reasonable use to which
each is entitled. 1
The highest reasonable use, and that which takes precedence over
lesser uses, is the domestic or natural use." Natural uses arise out of
the direct necessities of life, e.g. household uses, drinking, washing and
watering domestic animals, and these uses are of a higher priority than
irrigation." Riparian proprietors, as a class, may take a whole stream
for domestic purposes, leaving none for other uses." However, the use
of water from a stream to supply inhabitants of a town for domestic
purposes is not part of the riparian right."5
Artificial uses are those which are not intimately connected to life's
necessities and are typified as uses for the purposes of improvement,
trade or profit-chief of these in the arid West is irrigation." The
common-law doctrine of riparian rights and its application to artificial
uses has been modified in Washington, at least as it applies to irriga-
tion, and has had engrafted upon it the necessity of reasonable benefi-
cial use by the riparian owner." As between a riparian owner and an
appropriator, the one first in time is first in right. If the riparian
owner's claim be prior, he may take waters from the stream for irriga-
tion purposes in such proportion as his riparian lands bear to the
quantity of riparian land capable of being irrigated. 8 Should water in
excess of the riparian claimant's share be found in the stream, it is
49 Alexander v. Muenscher, 7 Wn2d 577, 110 P2d 625 (1941).
50 Smith v. Nechanicky, 123 Wash. 8, 211 Pac. 880 (1923).
51 Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915) ; Thompson v. Short,
6 Wn.2d 71, 106 P2d 720 (1940).
52 Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926); I WmIL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 740 (3rd ed. 1911)
66 Nesalous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1032 (1907). In addition, riparian
owners have exclusive fishing rights in the waters flowing over their lands. Griffith
v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
54 See Nielson v. Sponer, 46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155 (1907) ; McEvoy v. Taylor, 56
Wash. 357, 105 Pac. 851 (1909). For domestic uses incident to lands riparian to a
non-navigable lake see In, re Clinton Water District, 36 Wn.2d 285, 218 P.2d 309
(1950); 8 WASH. L. Rnv. 79 (1952).
55 Cartier Van Diesel v. Holland-Horr Mill Co., 91 Wash. 239, 157 Pac. 687 (1916).
56 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 743 (3rd ed. 1911).
57 State v. American Fruit Growers, 135 Wash. 156, 237 Pac. 498 (1925); see
notes 41, 46, supra.
58 Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926). If the supply
of water should be ample, the burden of showing a substantial injury from subsequent
appropriation is upon the riparian owner; if the supply of water should be less than
ample, the burden falls upon the appropriator to show that riparian rights will not be
injured by the appropriation. Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
[AUTUMN
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subject to appropriation for irrigation purposes on non-riparian lands."9
Among themselves, riparian owners have correlative rights to the use of
water for irrigation purposes, disregarding the fact that one riparian
owner's right antedates that of another." Riparian lands are not
entitled, as agricultural lands, to share in an apportionment of water for
irrigation purposes where they have been held for a long while in
private ownership without being devoted to agricultural purposes, but
rather, being devoted to timber purposes.6' A riparian owner has the
burden of showing his intention to bring more land under cultivation
within a reasonable time, and should he fail to do so, he is entitled only
to water sufficient to irrigate the land presently under cultivation."
Among other artificial uses are those of a riparian owner to use the
natural flow of a stream for the purpose of creating power for his elec-
tric light plant, and he may enjoin a log driving company from retard-
ing the flow to his detriment. 3 A riparian owner operating a mill does
not, however, have the right to flood adjacent lands through the mainte-
nance of a dam for water power necessary to run the mill.6"
In most jurisdictions riparian rights can be lost in many ways, but as
a general proposition lack of use of riparian water rights will not
destroy them." In this state however, non-user directly and prospec-
tively, does work a forfeiture of the riparian right to use water for
irrigation purposes.6 Since riparian water rights are inextricably
bound up with the land, and considered as realty,6" a riparian owner
may lose his water rights as well as his land by adverse user." Pre-
scriptive rights to the use of water may be acquired against upstream
or downstream riparian owners, but they require a showing of open,
notorious, exclusive, hostile and continuous use and possession for a
r9 See note 58, supra.
61 Ibid.
61 See note 57, supra.
1.,See note 58, supra. A subsequent purchaser of riparian land is entitled to the
same uses as his predecessor. Ex rel Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Cater, 149 Wash.
285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
1.1 Kalama Light & Power Co. v. Kalama Driving Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pac. 469,
(1908).
134 Durga v. Lincoln Creek Lumber Co., 47 Wash. 477, 92 Pae. 343 (1907).
t65 li re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931); 2 FARNHAM,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 463, 534 (1904).
#A State v. American Fruit Growers, 135 Wash. 156, 237 Pac. 498 (1925) ; see note
46, supra; Horowitz, Riparian and Appropriation Rights ta the Use of Water i
W1,ashington, 7 WASH. L. Rm. 197 (1932). By analogy, could non-user work a for-
feiture of other artificial uses? Query: domestic uses? For the possible effect of
non-user on the appropriative right see Thorpe v. McBride, 75 Wash. 466, 135 Pac. 228
(1913).
67 Note 19, supra; see Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash. 675, 19 P2d 97 (1933).
08 Smith v. Nechanicky, 123 Wash. 8, 211 Pac. 880 (1923) ; Mally v. Weidenstener,
88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
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period of ten years. 9 Prescriptive rights are not favored by the law,"
but once the necessary conditions are met, a grant or owner's consent to
the use of water as an easement therein will be presumed in favor of the
adverse user.7 Since only an easement can be obtained by prescription,
it follows therefore, that a prescriptive right might be acquired without
constant, continuous adverse user for the full statutory period, but
might manifest itself as a seasonal use over the necessary number of
years." Further, the size of the easement would then be determined by
the extent of the user." In this state, the extent of the user is measured
by the proportion of the total flow of the stream that was diverted by
the prescriptive user and is not fixed as a specific quantity of water.7"
Prescriptive rights to water cannot be acquired until the riparian owner
has been deprived of its use in such a substantial manner and degree so
as to notify him that his right is being invaded.7' The prescriptive
period begins to run only after the adverse use amounts to an actual
invasion of the rights of the true owner and a cause of action accrues
to him.7" This means that the use will not become adverse until an
invasion affects the total user from the stream thereby eliminating all
surplus waters so as to exceed and impinge upon the supply required by
the true owner of the water right.7 A permissive use for the full
statutory period gives no prescriptive right;" however, what was begun
as a possible permissive use can ripen into an adverse use under certain
circumstances, and a prescriptive right might accrue. This is the case
where the original owner for a long period of time recognizes a use
inconsistent with his own and the adverse user expends funds in reli-
ance thereon. 9 The burden of proof is, of course, upon the adverse
89 Smith v. Nechanicky, 123 Wash. 8, 211 Pac. 880 (1923).
70 Downie v. Renton, 167 Wash. 374, 9 P.2d 372 (1932).
7 1 Berryman v. East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co., 68 Wash. 657, 125 Pac. 130
(1912) ; also see Wasmund v. Harm, 36 Wash. 170, 78 Pac. 777. (1904).
72 If the acts of the alleged adverse user be at most desultory acts of trespass of
short duration and occur at widely separated intervals, e.g., discharging a reservoir
into a stream twice a year, they lack sufficient continuity and no prescriptive right
inures. Downie v. Renton, 167 Wash. 374, 9 P.2d 372 (1932) ; also see Annot. 93 Am.
St. Rep. 711 (1902). Nor do prescriptive rights accrue where the character of the use
changes from domestic to artificial during the period of the statute of limitations.
Hollett v. Davis, 54 Wash. 326, 103 Pac. 423 (1909).
73 Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276, 108 Pac. 608 (1910).
74 Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
75In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).
78 St. Martin v. Skamania Boom Co., 79 Wash. 393, 140 Pac. 355 (1914).
77 Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1910).
78 See note 77, supra; Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913).
79 Lyons v. Ingle, 96 Wash. 95, 164 Pac. 745 (1917) overriling 91 Wash. 179, 157
Pac. 460 (1916). See also Allen v. Roseburg, 70 Wash. 422, 126 Pac. 900 (1912);
Wilson v. Angelo, 176 Wash. 157, 28 P.2d 276 (1934).
[AUTUMN
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claimant, and evidence of a prescriptive right must be clear and con-
clusive before one will be presumed.8"
Riparian water rights can be lost by acquiescence,8' laches 2 or, more
importantly, by estoppel."3 Where the proprietor of land over which a
stream flows diverts it into an artificial channel and suffers it to remain
in its changed condition for a period exceeding the statute of limita-
tions he is estopped as against one making a beneficial use thereof, and
he may not return the stream to its natural channel to the beneficial
user's loss and injury."4 The beneficial user need not show a prescrip-
tive right in himself, nor a continuous use exceeding the statute of lim-
itations; what he must show is that the owner of the water right
diverted the stream and allowed it to remain in its changed state for the
duration of the statute of limitations, and that he has made a beneficial
use thereof relying upon the permanency of the change." An estoppel
will not operate in favor of a water claimant who violates a prior decree
adjudicating his rights thereto, because such a claimant could not hon-
estly believe that he had a right to use the water after the decree." If
a littoral owner merely stands by while a wrongdoer incurs expense in
construction,"7 there can be no estoppel provided the littoral owner
has done nothing to influence or which was intended to influence the
construction which, of course, cannot be on the littoral owner's land.8"
A statutory estoppel is found in the water codeY No Washington case
has been found wherein a riparian owner has been deprived of his water
rights because of avulsion."
80 In re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926).
s' Matheson v. Ward, 24 Wash. 407, 64 Pac. 520 (1901).
82 Mason v. Yearwood, 105 Wash. 335, 177 Pac. 777 (1919); see also Mason v.
Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276, 108 Pac. 608 (1910). Laches and acquiescence bar an injunc-
tion from issuing because of lack of diligence in seeking the remedy; whereas, estoppel
bars the right whatever remedial device be employed.
83 Hollett v. Davis, 54 Wash. 326, 103 Pac. 423 (1909). In addition, riparian
rights might be lost through non-user, prescription, avulsion or exercise of the power
of eminent domain. For the last see WASH. CoxsT. art. I, § 16, art. 16 § 1 and RCW
90.04.020, 90.04.030 and cases falling thereunder.
84 Hollet v. Davis, 54 Wash. 326, 103 Pac. 423 (1909).
8r Id. at 333, 103 Pac. at 426.86 in re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926).
's7 Construction of a dam across an arm of a lake in such a manner so as to with-
draw water from the littoral owner's realty.
v8 fadison v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718 (1905).
s9 RCW 90.12.120 "Any defendant who fails to appear in the proceedings after
service, and submit proof of his claim, shall be estopped from subsequently asserting
any right to the use of the water in question, except as determined by the decree."
01 See Wholey v. Caldwell, 108 Cal. 95, 41 Pac. 31, 30 L.R.A. 820 (1895) ; McKissick
Cattle Co. v. Alsoga, 41 Cal. App. 380, 182 Pac. 793 (1919); Butts v. Cummings, 117
Cal. App. 2d 334, 256 P.2d 52 (1953). Note Sumner Lumber Co. v. Pacific Coast
Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131 Pac. 220 (1913) for a possible acquisition of riparian
rights because of avulsion. Cf. Hirt v. Entus, 37 Wn.2d 418. 224 P.2d 620 (1950).
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APPROPRIATION RIGHTS
The heart of Washington's present water law system lies in the
application of the doctrine of prior appropriation to the water resources
of the state. The essence of this system lies in the Western necessity of
putting water to a beneficial use.9 Under this system, water rights date
in accordance with the theory that he who is prior in time is prior in
right. The water right acquired by the appropriator is a usufructuary
right only, i.e. the right to make use of the water, and consists not so
much of the fluid itself as the advantages flowing from its use." Water,
itself, can become personal property where circumstances are such that
it is severed from its original source of supply and reduced to the exclu-
sive possession of the appropriator-the usual case being a diversion of
water into a ditch."3 An appropriative water right has been held to be
realty at least if acquired since 1866,1" and it descends by inheritance.
It is an incorporeal hereditament as it is neither tangible nor visible."'
An action to quiet title to a water right will lie,"6 and it can be a proper
subject of a contract of sale." An appropriative right gives an interest
in the quality of the stream fixed as of the time of the appropriation,
and a prior appropriator may enjoin subsequent pollution which would
render the water unfit for the use for which it was appropriated."
Washington has employed three varying types of appropriation sys-
tems during its water law history; they are custom, notice and permit.
Acquisition of water rights through an appropriation of water from
the public domain in conformity with early prevailing customs was
recognized quickly in this state.9" Such an appropriation consisted of
an intention to appropriate followed by reasonable diligence in applying
91 Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) ; See also U.S. v. Big Bend Transit
Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. Wash. 1941).
02 See Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash. 669, 19 P.2d 97 (1933) ; Tyler v. Wilkinson,
24 Fed. Cas. 471, No. 14, 312 (C.C.D.C. 1827) ; Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 58 Am.
Dec. 408 (1853); I WiEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 18 (3rd ed.
1911).
93 See Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash. 669, 19 P.2d 97 (1933) ; II KINNEY, IRRIGA-
TION AND WATER RIGHTS § 773 (2nd ed. 1912); I WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES § 35 (3rd ed. 1911). California holds that water becomes personal
property only when delivered at the spigot to the consumer. Fudickar v. East Riverside
Irr. Dist., 109 Cal. 29, 41 Pac. 1024 (1895).
94 Adamson v. Black Rock Power Co., 12 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1926); Madison v.
McNeal, 171 Wash. 669, 19 P.2d 97 (1933).
95 See Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash. 669, 19 P.2d 97 (1933).
96 Barnes v. Belsaas, 73 Wash. 205, 131 Pac. 817 (1913) ; note also Miller v. Lake
Irr. Co., 27 Wash. 447, 67 Pac. 996 (1902).
97 Thompson Co. v. Pennebaker, 173 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1909).
98 Naches v. Cowiche Ditch Co., 87 Wash. 224, 151 Pac. 494 (1915) (dictum).
99 Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566, 20 Pac. 588 (1889) ; Isaacs v. Barber,
10 Wash. 124, 38 Pac. 871 (1894).
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the water to a beneficial use." 0 Posting a notice at the diversion site,
or elsewhere, was not required. 1 And, should the appropriator's
original intent be to appropriate water for an extended tract, while, in
fact, water is appropriated only for a portion thereof,"0 2 the appropri-
ator is entitled to water for the entire area originally conceived provided
the remainder of the extended tract is brought under cultivation with
reasonable diligence.' In such a case, the water right for the whole
tract dates from the time of the beginning of the work on the initial
diversion."0 "
A notice system setting forth certain requirements and formalities to
be followed when acquiring water rights by appropriation from the
public domain was adopted in statutory form in 1891,"' and later
repealed when the water code was adopted in 1917."8 The statutes
required, among other things, that an appropriator post a notice at his
proposed point of diversion setting forth: his intent to appropriate, the
amount of water sought, the purpose of the appropriation, the place
where the water was to be used and the means used to divert the water.
Strict compliance with all technical terms of the act was required,'1 7
and, if present, the date of the water right so acquired related back to
the time of posting the notice.' The notice system was not exclusive,
and should notice neither be posted nor filed, a water right could accrue,
by virtue of custom, to an appropriator who had made an actual appro-
priation in accordance with customary procedures.'
1o0 Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809 (1899) ; Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1,
135 Pac. 489 (1913) ; In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).
101 Kendall v. Joyce, 48 Wash. 489, 93 Pac. 1091 (1908) ; In re Crab Creek and
Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925); although not required, notice of an
appropriation can be used to help establish appropriative rights secured by custom
where it was followed by an actual appropriation. Allison v. Linn, 139 Wash. 474, 247
Pac. 731 (1926).
'02 The entire tract was 120 acres and the initial appropriation serviced 20 acres.
In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925).
103 Id. at 16, 235 Pac. at 40 See Still v. Palouse Irr. Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac.
466 (1911) as an example where due diligence was found lacking. Should riparian
rights attach to other owners during the "diligence period," they are subsequent to
the later perfected but earlier initiated appropriation rights. See In re Alpowa Creek,
129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).
104 In re Crab Creek And Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925).
l-Wash. Sess. Laws 1891, c. 21.00 Vash. Sess. Laws 1917, c. 117; also see Horowitz, Riparian And Appropriation
Rights to The Use of Iater It Washington, 7 WASH. L. Rav. 197 (1932) for a
discussion of early legislation.
107 In re Icicle Creek, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930) ; see also Pleasant Valley
Power Co. v. Okanogan Power Co., 98 Wash. 401, 167 Pac. 1122 (1917).
lo In re Ham, Yearsley and Ryrie v. Superior Ct., 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945
(1912).
105 In re Crab Creek And Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925). The
important difference between the two systems lies in the effective date of the water
right which is then used to determine priority ratings.
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The presently active statutes setting forth a permit system whereby
appropriation rights to the use of water may be acquired are found in
the water code.1 ' There can be no doubt that since the adoption of the
permit system in 1917 it is exclusive, and all new rights to the use of
water by appropriation can only be obtained through a compliance with
these procedures."' In fact, the wording of one section is so strongly in
favor of prior appropriation as the water policy of the state that prob-
ably no new riparian rights may be acquired after 1917 even though
one acquires previously unpatented riparian land." 2
Under the present permit system, the expectant appropriator must
apply to the supervisor of water resources for permission to use the
public waters before making a diversion."1 A temporary permit for the
use of water may be obtained pending the supervisor's determination
on the application. The supervisor must make a determination of,
among other things, the existence of water subject to appropriation, the
beneficial uses to which it may be put and whether the proposed use
conflicts with existing rights or with the public interest." 4 If the pro-
posed use should violate any of the above enumerated items then the
supervisor must reject the application for permit; otherwise, one will
issue." After filing the application for a permit the applicant must, on
the supervisor's instructions, publish notice of the application in news-
papers published at the county seat of the proposed diversion and at
the county seat of the prospective site of the beneficial use."' Assuming
that the permit be granted and the right acquired by appropriation be
perfected, it relates back and dates as of the time of filing the original
application in the office of the supervisor.'17
Either a riparian... landowner or a non-riparian... landowner can
acquire water rights to the use of water by appropriation. The situation
110 RCW 90.20.010 to 90.20.110.
"I See RCW 90.04.020.
12 RCW 90.04.020 reads, inter alia, "Subject to existing rights, all waters, within
the state belong to the public, and any right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be
acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and as provided in this title."(emphasis supplied). This statute would not apply to riparian lands acquired before its
enactment.
31 RCW 90.20.010.
14 RCW 90.20.050.
115 RCW 90.20.060.
116 RCW 90.20.040.
'17 RCW 90.20.110. Other western states following a version of the permit system
are: Arizona, California, Kansas, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.
Is See Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809 (1899) ; Haberman v. Sander, 166
Wash. 453, 7 P.2d 563 (1932).
119 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923); Hunter Land Co. v.
Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926).
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becomes unclear when one not a landowner seeks to appropriate. The
water code does not state clearly whether or not the appropriator must
be the owner of an interest in land,12 but it does contemplate that
appropriation rights acquired for irrigation purposes may become ap-
purtenant to the irrigated lands.121 Prior to the water code, it has been
held that an appropriator must own or have an interest in the land; 22
however, it might be sufficient if the appropriator be an actual bona fide
settler of the land having a possessory interest therein, but there must
be evidence of intent to acquire title in such a case.' "No rights flow
from the diversion and use of water by a mere squatter."'2 4 In addition
to its rights that may be secured by an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, the federal government is allowed to appropriate water in
conformity with state procedures and is treated in the same fashion as
is an individual appropriator. 5
All surplus surface12 or ground' 2 water found on public land in non-
navigable water courses is subject to appropriation whether it be found
on the public lands of the federal or state' government. This includes
non-navigable water courses found on school lands held by the state. 2 '
Pools of seepage water in a bog or marsh, on public land, having neither
inlet, outlet or flow nor fed by springs, do not constitute the character
of surface water authorized to be appropriated"0. for they are not within
a water course.'' As a general proposition, a water course must have
-" See RCW 9020.010. The water supervisor requires a statement of the interest
in the land owned by the prospective appropriator.
121 RCW 90.28.090, 90.20.060; U.S. v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 124 F. Supp. 818 (W. D.
Wash. 1954).
22 In re Waters of Doan Creek, 125 Wash. 14, 215 Pac. 343 (1923) (Lessees from
the state without an ownership interest in the land and with no intent of acquiring the
land could not be bona fide appropriators.) See also In re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash.
84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926).
1" Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913). The same is true of a specu-
lating squatter on relinquished government land who has made no entry in his own
behalf. Avery v. Johnson, 59 Wash. 332, 109 Pac. 1028 (1910).
1-4 Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913). Query: can an adverse
possessor acquire an appropriative right during the period of the statute of limitations?
125 RCW 90.40.040; Burley v. United States, 179 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1910). Except
no fees are charged the Federal Government.
126 RCW 90.04.020.
' 27 The ground water section applies the doctrine of prior appropriation to all natural
ground waters (those underground waters with ascertainable boundaries) and to all
artificial ground waters that have been abandoned or forfeited but not to percolating
ground water. RCW 90.44.040. See Elgin v. Weatherstone, 123 Wash. 429, 212 Pac.
562 (1923) for an application of appropriation doctrine to percolating and vagrant
waters.
I L In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925).
L25 The rule used to be different. See Colburn v. Winchell, 97 Wash. 27, 165 Pac.
1078 (1917) as modified by In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235
Pac. 37 (1925).
131, Dickey v. Maddux, 48 Wash. 411, 93 Pac. 1090 (1908).
131 Pays v. Roseburg, 123 Wash. 82, 211 Pac. 750 (1923).
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water that usually flows through a regular channel with bed and sides,"'
but it need not have a mouth, and springs may form its fountainhead."'
An appropriator may appropriate surplus water from a navigable
stream"3 4 in conformity with state appropriation procedures so long as
the total appropriation from the stream does not impair its naviga-
bility." Likewise, water between high and low water marks on a
navigable lake is subject to appropriation."" Further, should there be
water in a non-navigable natural water course in excess of the amount
that can be beneficially used within a reasonable time by the riparian
owners, that water is subject to appropriation.' However, water of
non-navigable stream within Indian reservations is not subject to appro-
priation as against subsequent riparian owners of lands within such
reservations.' It should be noted that whenever an appropriator seeks
to obtain water from federally controlled public domain located in the
State of Washington, he must follow the Washington appropriation
procedure to obtain the water right, and further, he must comply with
federal statutes to obtain a ditch right-of-way.'
Prior to the water code an appropriation of water consisted of an
intention to appropriate followed by reasonable diligence in applying
the water to a beneficial use. 4 The first step involved making a claim
to a given amount of water evincing thereby a clear intent to appropri-
ate. Evidence of intent to appropriate is unequivocal when the appro-
priator has proceeded under the notice system and posted notice of his
claim, and likewise, under the current permit system by filing an appli-
cation for a specific amount of water plus publishing notice thereof;
however, it is not as clear when the appropriator has proceeded in
accordance with custom. In such a case the fact of acquiring rights to
132 Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889).
133 In re Johnson Creek, 159 Wash. 629, 294 Pac. 566 (1930) ; see notes 20-29, supra.
134 The state test of navigability is found in Kemp v. Putnam, 47 NVn.2d 530, 288
P.2d 837 (1955) ; for the federal view see Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. G. F. Atkinson
Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), and Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal
Cases, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 8.
1- U.S. v. Rio Grande Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898); In re Crab Creek And Moses
Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925) ; see Washington v. F.P.C., 207 Fed. 391 (9th
Cir. 1953) for an example of administrative exercise of the commerce power superior
to state controls over a navigable stream.
136 Ortel v. Stone, 119 Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922).
"37 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923); Hunter Land Co. v.
Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926) ; it re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash.
635, 299 Pac. 649 (1931).
13s Hough v. Taylor, 110 Wash. 361, 188 Pac. 458 (1920).
139 Blue Creek Land Co. v. Battle Creek Sheep Co., 52 Idaho 728, 19 P.2d 628(1933); see 43 C.F.R. 244 (1954).
140 Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809 (1889) ; Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135
Pac. 489 (1913).
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land, an appropriator's residence thereon, and the cultivation of the
soil as well as the use to which the water has been put are all factors in
inferring the intent to appropriate."'
Since the right to use the water beneficially is the essence of an
appropriation, the means by which it is done are incidental.142 A
diversion can be made into an existing natural water course which is
currently carrying a flow of water. 4" Nontheless, a mechanical
diversion of the water is usually contemplated. 4 No Washington case
has been found wherein the discussion was directed specifically to
whether or not a mechanical diversion is necessary, and cases from
other jurisdictions differ. Where stock was watered from a natural
water course for forty years without any means of an artificial or
mechanical method of diverting water, it was held to be a valid appro-
priation. 4 ' On facts similar to those above, the Utah court disallowed
an alleged appropriation for stock watering purposes where the pur-
ported appropriator failed to show an exclusive use in himself. 46
Colorado has indicated that an appropriation might be perfected with-
out a mechanical diversion, 7 but not for agricultural purposes." 8 In
any event, should a diversion be started and successfully completed, an
appropriator's rights relate back and date as of the beginning of the
actual work and not from the date of the actual diversion, provided the
work has been prosecuted with reasonable diligence.'49 This includes
the survey necessary prior to the beginning of the actual construction
work in the case of an appropriation for power purposes.' The answer
as to what constitutes reasonable diligence must depend to a large
extent upon the circumstances of each case as the law does not require
an immediate use of the water, and the doctrine of common sense
applies.' One who is less diligent may not urge lack of diligence to
141 Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 67 Pac. 246, 58 L.R.A. 308 (1901).
142 Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809 (1889).
143 Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1910).
144 See RCW 90.20.020; Grant Realty Co. v. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie, 96 Wash. 616,
626, 165 Pac. 495, 499 (1917).
146 Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 Pac. 772 (1931). This case
indicates that a diversion for agricultural purposes is absolutely necessary, but that a
waterfall used for power purposes need not be diverted.
'46 Robinson v. Schoenfeld, 62 Utah 233, 218 Pac. 1041 (1923).
147 Empire Water Co. v. Cascade, 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
148 Windsor Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 Pac. 729 (1908).
140 Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926).
1W Sumner Lumber Co. v. Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131 Pac. 220
(1913) ; See II KINNEY, IMUGATIN AND WAraa RIGHTS, § 747 (2nd ed. 1912).
161 U.S. v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. Wash. 1941); It re
Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924). Other cases wherein the question
has been discussed: Grant Realty Co. v. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie, 96 Wash. 616, 165
Pac. 495 (1917) ; Pleasant Valley Irr. Co. v. Okanogan, 98 Wash. 401, 167 Pac. 1122
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defeat an appropriative right where only two parties are involved.' -
The final step requisite to perfecting an appropriation is to apply the
water to a beneficial use with the intent to appropriate." 3 The appro-
priator may apply the water to any beneficial use he chooses,' and, in
changing from one use to another, he neither lessens his rights nor
forfeits his priority. 5' An appropriation can be made for any beneficial
purpose,'56 and what constitutes a beneficial purpose varies; however,
some of the more usual beneficial uses are: domestic, irrigation, stock
watering, storage, mining and milling, and the generation of heat, power
and electricity." 7 From decisions of other jurisdictions, it might be said
that a beneficial use involves an application of the water in an exclusive
manner 1s5 so as to reap an economic as distinguished from an aesthetic
benefit for the appropriator.' 5
When an expectant appropriator is proceeding under the current
permit system the application submitted for a permit to appropriate
water contains limitations of both time and quantity on the requested
appropriative right.' It restricts the appropriator to the exact nature
and amount of water originally claimed by him for the proposed use as
well as the exact time during which water will be required each year.'
The water code employs a "second foot"'62 and an "acre foot"'n 3 as its
units of measurement. 4 Prior to the water code a many times indefi-
nite unit of measurement known as the "miner's inch"'65 was utilized." '
(1917); Still v. Palouse, 64 Wash. 606, 117 Pac. 466 (1911). Also see I WIEL, WTER
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 383 (3rd ed. 1911).
152 State v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 331, 235 Pac. 809 (1925).
'131 WIEL, WATER RiGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 377 (3rd ed. 1911).
1' U.S. v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F.Supp. 459 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
15 it re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924) ; U.S. v. Big Bend Transit
Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. Wash. 1941). But cf. Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57
Pac. 809 (1889). Provided, of course, that they have not been fixed by a prior decree.
See Helensdale Water Co. v. Blew, 146 Wash. 350, 262 Pac. 958 (1928).
156 See Thompson v. Pennebaker, 173 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1909).
157 See Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670 (1875), and I WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WESTERN STATES § 378 (3rd ed. 1911).151 Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309
(1917).
15 Empire Power Co. v. Cascade, 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
160 RCW 9020.020.
161 Ibid.
162 This means a flow of water equal to one cubic foot per second.
163 This means a unit of water volume equal to forty-three thousand five hundred and
sixty cubic feet.
164 RCW 90.04.010.
265 This means the amount of water capable of flowing through a hole one inch
square under a certain head pressure of water. It was unreliable because the amount
varies directly with the head pressure and no standard head pressure was employed
although four inches was common. See I WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES § 486 (3rd ed. 1911).
166 Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 67 Pac. 246, 58 L.R.A. 308 (1901).
[AUTUIIN
1VASHINGTON WATER RIGHTS
However, the absolute limitation on the appropriative right is the
amount of the water actually taken and put to a beneficial use 67 and
not all of the water that has been diverted."' When the court applies
the doctrine of "relation back" and is considering "due diligence", the
quantity of the water appropriated becomes a movable limit which may
gradually increase, and it can be inferred from the quantity of the land
occupied by the appropriator, with its boundaries thus defined and
claimed."'
An appropriator has the right to change the point of diversion and
the place of use of his water rights provided the change can be made
without injury to existing rights, but the appropriator may not do so
without permission from the supervisor of water resources.7 This
applies to a permanent or temporary change including rotation in the
utilization of water for a more economical use.", An approved change
in the point of diversion affects neither the priority rights to the use of
water 7 ' nor the existence of any of the rights."' However, where the
benefits of sub-irrigation would be lessened and springs dried up from
changing streamflow to other lands, the right to change the point of
diversion will be denied even though a temporary permit has been
issued.' Interested parties opposing a change in the place where a
water right is used have the burden of showing that the proposed change
would prejudice their rights."
The appropriative water right can be lost by an abandonment where
an actual relinquishment of its use coexists with an intention to aban-
don. 6 These two elements must be proved to exist simultaneously,
and as a consequence, abandonment is always voluntary and a question
of fact with the burden of proof on the party alleging its existence.'
'-7 Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1910) ; Ortel v. Stone, 119
Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922) ; see RCW 9020.070.11s See Beetchenow v. Bartholet, 162 Wash. 119, 298 Pac. 335 (1931); I WIEL,
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 478 (3rd ed. 1911).
160 Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 67 Pac. 246 (1901) ; approved in In re Crab
Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925).
170 RCW 90.28.090; U.S. v. Union Gap Irr. Co. 209 Fed. 274 (E. D. Wash. 1913).
171 RCW 90.28.100.
172 In re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926).
17U In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924) ; U.S. v. Big Bend Transit
Co. 42 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. Wash. 1941).
,74 Haberman v. Sander, 166 Wash. 453, 7 P.2d 563 (1932) followed in Lawrence v.
Sander, 166 Wash. 703, 7 P.2d 567 (1932) rehearing denied Lawrence v. Sander, 169
Wash. 705, 14 P.2d 961 (1932). See also White Bros. Co. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666,
117 Pac. 497 (1911).
175 Osborn v. Chase, 119 Wash. 476, 205 Pac. 844 (1922).
1713 Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913). They may also be lost by for-
feiture, adverse use, estoppel, or through eminent domain proceedings. See I WIEL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 478 (3rd ed. 1911).
177 See 'Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1909). Failure to mention
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Non-user alone is not sufficient to effect an abandonment of the water
right; it is merely evidence of intent to abandon.'" Eleven years non-
use of a ditch has been held to be an abandonment of the right to dis-
charge waste waters into it.1'79
The appropriative water right cannot be lost through a forfeiture for
non-use in this state because there is no general forfeiture statute.'
However, since the essence of the doctrine of prior appropriation lies in
the philosophy of putting water to its highest beneficial use, a forfeiture
statute for non-user should be enacted in order to insure the furtherance
of this philosophy. If such a statute were enacted, the result would
produce a statutory pattern common to that in other western states.","
water rights in a deed is not evidence of abandonment. Pays v. Roseburg, 123 Wash.
82, 211 Pac. 750 (1923).
178 Thorp v. McBride, 75 Wash. 466, 135 Pac. 228 (1913).
179 Phillips v. Coumbe, 90 Wash. 543, 156 Pac. 535 (1916).
180 But cf. RCW 90.20.090. There is a forfeiture provision in the Ground Water
Code, RCW 90.44.190.
,81 E.g., Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming.
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